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Abstract
This paper develops a medium-scale dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
for fi scal policy simulations. Relative to existing models of this type, our model incorporates 
two important features. First, we consider a two-country monetary union structure, which 
makes it well suited to simulate fi scal measures by relatively large countries in a currency area. 
Second, we provide a notable degree of disaggregation on the government expenditures 
side, by explicitly distinguishing between (productivity-enhancing) public investment, 
public purchases and the public sector wage bill. In addition, we consider a labor market 
characterized by search and matching frictions, which allows to analyze the response of 
equilibrium unemployment to fi scal measures. In order to illustrate some of its applications, 
and motivated by recent policy debate in the Euro Area, we calibrate the model to Spain and 
the rest of the area and simulate a number of fi scal consolidation scenarios. We fi nd that, 
in terms of output and employment losses, fi scal consolidation is the least damaging when 
achieved by reducing the public sector wage bill, whereas it is most damaging when carried 
out by cutting public investment.
Keywords: DSGE model, fi scal policy, two-country monetary union, disaggregation of fi scal 
expenditures, labor market frictions.
JEL classifi cation: E62, H30.
Resumen
Este artículo presenta un modelo de equilibrio general dinámico y estocástico, de tamaño 
medio, para simulaciones de política fi scal. Respecto de otros modelos de este tipo, 
nuestro modelo incorpora dos características importantes. Por un lado, consideramos una 
estructura de unión monetaria con dos países, lo cual la hace bien indicada para simular 
medidas fi scales por parte de países grandes dentro de una unión monetaria. Segundo, 
proporcionamos un grado notable de desagregación del gasto público, distinguiendo 
explícitamente entre inversión pública (que tiene efectos positivos sobre la productividad), 
compras netas y salarios públicos. Además, consideramos un mercado laboral con fricciones 
de búsqueda y emparejamiento, lo cual permite analizar la respuesta del desempleo a 
medidas fi scales. Para ilustrar alguna de sus aplicaciones, y motivados por los debates 
recientes en el seno de la zona euro, calibramos el modelo para España y el resto de la 
UEM y simulamos una serie de escenarios de consolidación fi scal. Encontramos que, en 
términos de producción y empleo, la manera menos dañina de realizar una consolidación 
fi scal es reducir los salarios del sector público, mientras que la manera más costosa es 
recortar la inversión pública.
Palabras claves: Modelo DSGE, política fi scal, unión monetaria de dos países, desagregación 
del gasto público, fricciones del mercado laboral.
Códigos JEL: E62, H30.
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1 Introduction
The recent crisis has obliged governments around the world to put in place ambitious fiscal
stimulus plans and the ensuing fiscal consolidation (or “exit”) strategies in order to assure
fiscal stability. The latter issue is moving center stage in current public debates. In order to
bring fiscal balances back on track, fiscal authorities mainly have the possibility of increas-
ing taxes and/or cutting public spending. But which taxes should be increased? Which
spending components should be cut? All across Europe, countries such as Germany, Greece,
Portugal, Spain and others have put forward consolidation plans that include cuts in public
employment, public wages and public investment as well as increases in VAT and labor in-
come tax rates. Which consequences can we expect from these measures on, among others,
output, unemployment or international competitiveness? What are the short-run costs and
long-run benefits of such measures? In this paper, we present “FiMod – A DSGE Model for
Fiscal Policy Simulations”, a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model jointly
developed by Banco de España and Deutsche Bundesbank staff in order to address exactly
such kind of questions. The model has been used for policy simulations in the Working
Group on EconometricModelling (WGEM) of the European Systemof Cenrtal Banks (ESCB).
DSGE models provide a reliable tool for evaluating alternative policy measures. For
this reason, fiscal policy analysis in DSGE models has gained momentum recently. The ap-
plications of such models include the assessment of temporary versus permanent fiscal stim-
ulus, the assessment of structural changes in public tax and spending policy, the analysis of
fiscal multipliers and the role of private demand as well as fiscal policy’s interaction with
monetary policy (in particular, at the zero-lower bound). Without completeness, relevant
studies include Galí and Monacelli (2008), who analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policy
in a currency union; Coenen et al. (2008), who simulate structural tax reforms based on the
European Central Bank’s New Area Wide Model (NAWM; see Christoffel et al. 2008); Boscá
et al. (2009a, 2009b, 2010), who analyze several policy measures based on the REMS model,
which is used by the Spanish Ministry of Finance; Colciago et al. (2009), who assess the role
of automatic stabilizers in a monetary union; Christiano et al. (2009), Cogan et al. (2009)
and Hall (2009), all of which analyze fiscal multipliers; and Eggertsson (2009) and Erceg and
Lindé (2010), who assess fiscal policy at the zero-lower bound. Freedman et al. (2009) ad-
dress the question of potential short-run benefits and long-run costs of fiscal deficits, while
Coenen et al. (2010a, 2010b) and Hebous (2010) provide a comprehensive overview of the
effects of fiscal policy stimulus in structural models. Several institutions and authors, in-
cluding some of the ones mentioned above, are working on improving their models in order
to be better able to picture relevant fiscal policy features.1
Our framework contributes to the literature on medium-scale DSGE models for fiscal
policy analysis in two important ways. First, the model incorporates a two-country mon-
etary union structure. This makes it well suited to analyze fiscal policy measures by large
countries in a monetary union, as is the case of Germany, France, Italy or Spain inside the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union (EMU). The two-country structure allows to consider the spillover
effects of fiscal actions in one country to the other, and vice versa. Most of the models men-
1For example, members of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) are conducting fiscal policy simu-
lations in their DSGE models such as the Bank of Portugal in PESSOA (see, for example, Almeida et al.,
2010), the Bank of Finland in Aino (e.g. Kilponen and Ripatti, 2005) and the European Central Bank in the
EAGLE-model (see Gomes et al., 2010). Also, the EU Commission is further activating their Quest III-model
to conduct fiscal policy analyses (see Ratto et al., 2009).
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tioned above focus either on large economies with an independent monetary policy reaction
function, or on small open economies that do not influence the rest of the world. Second,
we provide a notable degree of disaggregation on the fiscal expenditures side. In particular,
we explicitly distinguish between public investment and public consumption; the latter in
turn is divided between public purchases and the public sector wage bill. Each of these com-
ponents has a distinct effect on the rest of the economy. The model thus allows to simulate
specific measures that have been implemented recently in a number of European countries,
such as cuts in public sector wages and/or employment, and reductions in public invest-
ment. Fiscal expenditures are completed with a number of transfers to the private sector,
including unemployment benefits and lump-sum subsidies. On the fiscal revenues side,
the model considers also a wide range of taxes, including taxes on consumption, labor in-
come, returns on bond holdings and on physical capital, and social security contributions.
In addition, our model incorporates the modern theory of equilibrium unemployment by
introducing search and matching frictions in the labor market, along the lines of Pissarides
(2000); this allows us to study the effects of fiscal actions on unemployment. Finally, fol-
lowing Galí et al. (2007) we assume the existence of rule-of-thumb (RoT) households, which
allows us to consider non-Ricardian effects of fiscal policy.2
For the purpose of illustration, we calibrate the home country in the model to Spain
and the foreign country to the rest of the EMU. We then use the calibrated model to simulate
some of the measures recently implemented or announced by the Spanish fiscal authorities.
In particular, we simulate reductions in public sector wages and public employment. Since
the public wage bill is a component of public consumption, it is interesting to compare the
resulting effects to those stemming from a reduction in public purchases, the component that
most closely resembles the usual definition of ‘government consumption’ in DSGE models.
We also analyze a decrease in public investment, which differs from public consumption
in that the stock of public capital (for example, infrastructures) has a beneficial effect on
private sector productivity. Regarding the fiscal revenues side, we simulate increases in VAT
and labor income tax rates. In order to make all these measures comparable, we calibrate
the change in each fiscal instrument so as to produce an (ex-ante) reduction in the primary
deficit to GDP ratio of one percentage point. All measures are assumed to be permanent,
which allows us to assess short-run and long-run effects. Furthermore, we assume that
the long-run fiscal saving resulting from lower interest payments on outstanding debt is
used to reduce labor income taxes, which allows us to capture the long-run benefits of fiscal
consolidation.
Our results can be summarized as follows. Fiscal consolidation is most damaging (in
terms of output and employment losses) when performed via public investment cuts, both
in the short and the long-run. Most of the short-run effects are driven by the direct effect of
public investment on aggregate demand, whereas the negative long-run effects are mainly
the result of the gradual decline in the public capital stock and thus in private-sector produc-
tivity. A cut in public purchases has similar (although slightly smaller) contractionary effects
in the short-run, whereas the long-run effects are positive thanks to the reduction in distor-
tionary labor income taxation. By contrast, reductions in public sector employment or wages
are the least damaging alternatives. First, the public sector wage bill is not a component of
2Our integration of search and matching frictions and RoT households follows Boscá et al. (2010), who are to
our knowledge the first to have incorporated both features into a medium-scale DSGE model for fiscal policy
simulations.
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aggregate demand for privately-produced goods and services. Second, both measures have
positive spillovers on private-sector employment and output, because they lower workers’
outside option in wage negotiations, which allows firms to reduce their labor costs and thus
improve their international competitiveness.3 With regard to taxation, we find that an in-
crease in the labor income tax rate has relatively small contractionary effects on output and
employment. In a standard search and matching framework, unlike in neoclassical models
of the labor market, labor income taxation does not affect labor supply per se, which is ver-
tical at the level of the labor force; however, it does raise wage claims by matched workers
and hence the resulting wage agreements. Our results suggest that the bargaining process
in a matching framework partially dampens the effects of labor income taxation on employ-
ment. An increase in the consumption tax rate has comparable short-run effects on economic
activity, for similar reasons. Finally, we simulate a measure usually referred to as ‘fiscal de-
valuation’ – conducted in Germany in 2007 and currently under discussion in several EMU
member countries–, where we decrease the consumption tax rate and let a reduction in social
security contributions (instead of labor income taxes) absorb the saving in interest payments
on public debt; we find that such a measure would favor the Spanish economy thanks to the
reduction in labor costs, while the spillovers to the rest of EMU would be rather small but
positive.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2.
Section 3 evaluates the impact of the policy measures announced by the Spanish govern-
ment. We also focus on the comparison of a reduction in public employment and public
wages, respectively, to a decrease in public purchases (the way a cut in public consumption
has conventionally been modelled so far). Furthermore, we differentiate between short and
long-run effects. In Section 4, we present an analysis in which long-run proceeds of increas-
ing VAT are used to cut social security contributions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section presents the details of FiMod, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium frame-
work which is especially suitable for the analysis of fiscal policy issues. It is currently cal-
ibrated for Spain in the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, it can easily be re-
calibrated to fit the characteristics of any other monetary union economy. The calibration
strategy is also detailed at the end of this section.
We consider a two-country monetary union in which we normalize population size to
unity, of which ω ∈ (0, 1) live in the home country (Spain), while the remaining (1 − ω)
live in the foreign country (rest of EMU). Throughout the paper, quantity variables will be
expressed in per capita terms, unless otherwise indicated; aggregate quantities can easily be
obtained by multiplying per capita quantities by each country’s population. Both regions
are modeled analogously, while we allow structural parameters to differ. Each country is
inhabited by households who consume home and foreign consumption goods and supply
3Both measures differ though in their effects on GDP and total employment. In national accounts, GDP is de-
fined as the sum of private-sector production and government production, where the latter is valued at input
costs (i.e. the government wage bill); whereas ceteris paribus a cut in government wages affects only the GDP
deflator (thus leaving real GDP unchanged), the reduction in public employment implies a reduction in real
government production and hence in real GDP. Regarding total employment, the cut in public wages im-
proves private-sector and therefore total employment, whereas a reduction in public employment dominates
the positive spillover to private-sector employment and thus lowers total employment.
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labor. Following Galí et al. (2007), we assume that only a fraction of households can buy
and sell assets (in particular, physical capital, domestic government debt and international
bonds), while the rest consume their disposable income and thus behave in a non-Ricardian
fashion. Both types of household also enjoy utility from government services.
Private production is split in three sub-sectors. Retailers buy intermediate goods va-
rieties, bundle these into a final good and sell the latter to the home and foreign market
under perfect competition. We assume that there is no price discrimination between the two
markets. Intermediate goods producers use labor services and private capital as production
inputs. Cost minimization determines the amounts of each input used per firm. As sellers
of differentiated products, intermediate goods-producing firms enjoy monopolistic power
and are thus able to set their nominal price, which they do in a staggered manner following
Calvo (1983). Furthermore, the stock of public capital (infrastructures, etc.) enters the private
production function and thus increases private sector productivity. Finally, a sector of labor
firms search for unemployed workers in a frictional labor market, hire them, produce labor
services and sell these to the intermediate goods sector for a perfectly competitive price. Ex-
cept for the frictional labor market structure, the production sector is similar to Smets and
Wouters (2003, 2007) or Christiano et al. (2005) and can thus be considered standard.
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions, in the tradition of
Pissarides (2000). This implies that it takes time for unemployed workers and vacant jobs
to be matched and, therefore, generates involuntary unemployment. We assume that both
private firms and the government search in the same pool of unemployment, which means
that unemployed individuals may find a job in either of the two sectors. Wages in the private
sector are set in a staggered manner along the lines of Bodart et al. (2006), Christoffel et al.
(2009) and de Walque et al. (2009). The wage bargaining is undertaken by a union. The
public sector wage and employment levels are autonomously set by the government as in
Quadrini and Trigari (2007), Afonso and Gomes (2008) or Gomes (2009).
The government is split into monetary and fiscal policy. The monetary authority sets
the nominal area-wide reference interest rate (i.e. the ECB rate) according to a Taylor-type
rule that responds to measured area-wide inflation and output gap. Fiscal policy is con-
ducted autonomously in each country. National fiscal authorities finance themselves with
taxes on consumption, wage income and returns on capital and bond investments, as well
as with social security contributions, lump-sum taxes and debt. Furthermore, each fiscal
authority can issue public debt. On the other hand, each government spends in privately-
produced consumption and investment goods, public sectorwages, unemployment benefits,
lump-sum subsidies, and interest payments on outstanding debt.
We will start by describing the household sector in section 2.1. Then, we turn to the
production sector in section 2.2, while section 2.3 details the labor market. Fiscal authorities
are described in section 2.4, followed by a description of international linkages in section 2.5
wherewe also detail themonetary policy rule and derive themissing equilibrium conditions,
while the calibration strategy is explained in section 2.6.
2.1 Households
Following Galí et al. (2007), we assume that each country is populated by a share (1− μ) of
optimizing (or Ricardian) households who have unrestricted access to capital markets and
are therefore able to substitute consumption intertemporally. The remaining share μ ∈ [0, 1)
of households is considered to be liquidity-constrained in the sense that they can neither
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save nor borrow and, thus, consume all their labor income in each period, i.e. they behave in
a non-Ricardian fashion. This household type has become known as ‘rule-of-thumb’ house-
hold in the literature. Each household has a continuum of members of size one. The welfare
function of each type of representative household is given by
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
βt · ut
(
cit, c
i
t−1, g˜t
)}
, (1)
where Et is the expectations operator conditional on time-t information, cit denotes house-
hold consumption of final goods, and the superscripts i = o, r denote optimizing and rule-
of-thumb households, respectively. The variable g˜t is government services produced by
public employees, which is taken as given by private households. The instantaneous utility
function is given by
u
(
cit, c
i
t−1, g˜t
)
=
{
[cit−h·cit−1]
1−σc
−1
1−σc
+ ζ ·
g˜1−σct −1
1−σc
, σc > 0, σc = 1
log
[
cit − h · c
i
t−1
]
+ ζ · log[g˜t ], σc = 1
. (2)
The parameter σc is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (equal to the inverse of the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution), h denotes the degree of habit formation in consump-
tion, and ζ > 0 is a parameter capturing the relative valuation of public consumption in the
households’ utility function.
Inside each household, its members may be employed in the public sector, in the pri-
vate sector, or unemployed. We assume full consumption insurance within the household,
as in Andolfatto (1996) or Merz (1995). This holds both for Ricardian and rule-of-thumb
households. In this regard, our specification of rule-of-thumb households differs somewhat
from Galí et al. (2007); see also Boscá et al. (2009a, 2009b, 2010) for a more detailed explana-
tion. However, the level of unemployment affects the disposable income of rule-of-thumb
households, such that they still face a true income risk from employment fluctuations.
We assume that both countries trade consumption and investment goods as well as in-
ternational nominal bonds. Trade in goods is modelled as follows. The consumption basket
of a type-i household in the home country is given by
cit =
(
ciAt
ω + ψ
)ω+ψ (
ciBt
1− ω − ψ
)1−ω−ψ
,
where ciAt and c
i
Bt are consumption of goods produced in country A (home) and B (foreign),
respectively, and ψ is a parameter capturing the degree of home bias in consumption. Cost
minimization by the household implies,
ciAt
ciBt
=
ω + ψ
1− ω − ψ
PBt
PAt
,
where PAt and PBt are the producer price indexes (PPI) in countries A and B, respectively. From
now onwards, let
pBt ≡
PBt
PAt
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denote the terms of trade. Analogously, production technologies make use of a combination
of investment goods produced in both countries. The basket of investment goods (which are
assumed to be owned by type-o households only) is given by
Iot =
(
IoAt
ω + ψ
)ω+ψ ( IoBt
1− ω − ψ
)1−ω−ψ
,
where IoAt and I
o
Bt are investment in goods produced in country A and B, respectively. Again,
cost minimization implies that
IoAt
IoBt
=
ω + ψ
1− ω − ψ
pBt.
The above equations imply that nominal expenditure in consumption and investment goods
equal PAtciAt + PBtc
i
Bt = Ptc
i
t and PAtI
o
At + PBt I
o
Bt = Pt I
o
t , respectively, where
Pt = (PAt)
ω+ψ (PBt)
1−ω−ψ
is the corresponding before-VAT consumer price index (before-VAT CPI). Notice that Pt =
PAt · p
1−ω−ψ
Bt . Therefore, before-VAT CPI inflation, πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1, evolves according to
πt = πAt
(
pBt
pBt−1
)1−ω−ψ
,
where πAt ≡ PAt/PAt−1 is PPI inflation in country A. In practice, consumer price indexes
are constructed with after-VAT prices, which in our model correspond to Pt (1+ τct ). For this
reason, we also define after-VAT CPI inflation,
πτ
c
t ≡ πt ·
1+ τct
1+ τct−1
,
which will be the relevant inflation measure to be taken into account by themonetary author-
ity. From now onwards, however, we will simply use ‘CPI’ in order to refer to ‘before-VAT
CPI’.
2.1.1 Optimizing households
In order to calculate households’ optimal choices, we first have to describe the budget con-
straints they are facing. Each optimizing households’ real labor income (gross of taxes) is
given by wpt n
p,o
t + w
g
t n
g,o
t , where w
p
t is the average real wage in the private sector (to be de-
rived later), wgt is the real wage in the government sector, and n
p,o
t and n
g,o
t are the number
of type-o household members employed in the private and government sector, respectively.
Wages are taxed by the government at rate τwt . When unemployed, the household member
receives unemployment benefits κB. Consumption expenditures are taxed at rate τct . The
household can invest in physical capital kot , which earns a real rental rate r
k
t and depreciates
at rate δk. Returns on physical capital (net of depreciation allowances) are taxed at rate τkt .
The latter can be seen as a proxy for corporate taxes, as private investment decisions are
assumed to be made by households. The optimizing household can also purchase nominal
government bonds Bot , which pay a gross nominal interest rate Rt. Returns on government
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bonds are taxed at the rate τbt . Finally, optimizing households can hold international nomi-
nal bonds, Dot . In order to ensure stationarity of equilibrium, we follow Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2003) and assume that home agents pay a risk-premium (on top of the area-wide
nominal policy rate, which we denote by Recbt ) that increases with the country’s net foreign
asset position. In particular we assume that the nominal interest rate paid or received by
home investors is given by Recbt exp(−ψd(dt − d¯)/Yt), with ψd > 0, where dt ≡ Dt/PAt, Dt
is the home country’s nominal net foreign asset position and (−) dt/Yt is the ratio of net
foreign debt over output. We assume for simplicity that trade in international bonds is not
taxed. Taking these elements together, the budget constraint of the representative optimizing
households in real terms reads
(1+ τct )c
o
t + I
o
t +
Bot + D
o
t
Pt
+
Tt
1− μ
=
Πt
Pt
+
(
(1− τkt )r
k
t + τ
k
t δ
k
)
kot−1
+
Rt−1Bot−1
Pt
+
Recbt−1e
−ψd(dt−1−d¯)/Yt−1Dot−1
Pt
−τbt
(Rt−1 − 1) Bot−1
Pt
+
Subt
1− μ
(3)
+(1− τwt )
(
wpt n
p,o
t + w
g
t n
p,g
t
)
+ (1− np,ot − n
g,o
t )κ
B,
where Πt are nominal per capita profits from firms (which are assumed to be owned by the
optimizing households) redistributed in a lump-sum manner, and Tt and Subt are lump-sum
taxes and subsidies, respectively. The law of motion of private physical capital is given by
kot = (1− δ
k)kot−1 + [1− S (I
o
t /I
o
t−1)] I
o
t , (4)
where S
(
Iot /I
o
t−1
)
= κI2
(
Iot /I
o
t−1 − 1
)2 represents investment adjustment costs (see Chris-
tiano et al., 2005; for a discussion). Maximizing (1) given (2) subject to equations (3) and (4)
yields the following standard first-order conditions,
for cot : λ
o
t =
[cot−h·cot−1]
−σc
−β·h·Et
{
[cot+1−h·cot ]
−σc
}
(1+τct )
, (5)
for Bot : λ
o
t = β · Et
{
λot+1 ·
Rt·(1−τbt+1)+τ
b
t+1
πt+1
}
, (6)
for kot : Qt = β · Et
{
λot+1
λot
[
(1− δk)Qt+1 + (1− τkt+1) · r
k
t+1 + τ
k
t+1 · δ
k
]}
, (7)
for Iot : 1 = Qt
[
1− S
(
Iot /I
o
t−1
)
− Iot · S
′
(
Iot /I
o
t−1
)]
+β · Et
{
λot+1
λot
Qt+1
Iot+1
2
Iot
S′
(
Iot+1/I
o
t
)} , (8)
for Dot : λ
o
t = βR
ecb
t · e
−ψ2(dt−d¯)/Yt · Et
{
λot+1
πt+1
}
, (9)
where λot is the Lagrange multiplier on equation (3) and Qt · λ
o
t is the Lagrange multiplier
on equation (4). Therefore, λot represents the marginal utility of real income, whereas Qt
represents the shadow real price of a unit of physical capital, i.e. Tobin’s Q. Optimality
additionally requires that the No-Ponzi condition on wealth is satisfied, which we assume
to hold henceforth.
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2.1.2 Non-Ricardian households
As non-Ricardian households can neither save nor borrow, their budget constraint simplifies
to
(1+ τct )c
r
t = (1− τ
w
t )
(
wpt n
p,r
t + w
g
t n
g,r
t
)
+ (1− np,rt − n
g,r
t )κ
B, (10)
which determines rule-of-thumb consumption, crt . The corresponding marginal utility of
consumption for rule-of-thumb households is, thus, given from maximizing (1) for i = r
subject to (2) and (10), that is,
λrt =
[crt−h·crt−1]
−σc
−β·h·Et
{
[crt+1−h·crt]
−σc
}
(1+τct )
. (11)
2.1.3 Aggregation
Given the above description, consumption per capita in the home country equals the
weighted average of consumption for each household type, i.e.
Ct = (1− μ) · cot + μ · c
r
t . (12)
For future reference, per capita domestic demand for the home country’s and the foreign
country’s consumption good equal
CAt = (1− μ) coAt + μc
r
At,
CBt = (1− μ) coBt + μc
r
Bt,
respectively. For the quantity variables that exclusively concern optimizing households, per
capita amounts are given simply by
kt = (1− μ)kot ,
Bt
Pt
= (1− μ)
Bot
Pt
,
It = (1− μ)Iot ,
Dt = (1− μ)Dot .
IAt = (1− μ) IoAt,
IBt = (1− μ) IoBt,
Employment aggregation will be described in the labor market section.
2.2 Production
The retail and intermediate goods sectors of the economy are similar to Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2007) or Christiano et al. (2005), with the exception that labor services are not hired
directly from the households but from a sector of firms that produce homogenous labor
services in the manner of Christoffel at al. (2009) or de Walque et al. (2009). It is the latter
firms that hire workers and bargain over wages with them. In this subsection, we focus on
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the retail and intermediate goods sectors, postponing the description of the labor market to
the next subsection.
2.2.1 Retailers
There is a measure-ω continuum of firms in the retail (or final good) sector. Each retail firm
purchases a variety of differentiated intermediate goods, bundle these into a final good and
sell the latter under perfect competition. We assume that the law of one price holds within
the union, which means that the price of the home country’s final good is the same in both
countries and equal to PAt. The maximization problem of the representative retail firm reads
max
{y˜t(j):j∈[0,ω]}
PAtYt −
∫ ω
0
PAt(j)y˜t(j)dj, (13)
where
Yt =
(∫ ω
0
(
1
ω
)1/
y˜t(j)(−1)/dj
)/(−1)
,  > 1, (14)
is the retailer’s production function, y˜t(j) is the retailer’s demand for each differentiated
input j ∈ [0, ω], and PAt(j) is the nominal price of each input. The first-order condition for
each input j ∈ [0, ω] reads
y˜t(j) =
(
PAt(j)
PAt
)− Yt
ω
. (15)
Combining the latter with (13) and the zero profit condition, we obtain that the producer
price index in the home country must equal
PAt =
(∫ ω
0
1
ω
PAt(j)1−dj
)1/(1−)
.
Notice that, since there are ω retail firms, total demand for each intermediate input equals
ωy˜t(j) ≡ yt(j) =
(
PAt(j)
PAt
)−
Yt. (16)
2.2.2 Intermediate goods
Firms in the intermediate goods sector have mass ω. Each producer j ∈ [0, ω] operates the
following technology,
yt(j) = a ·
(
kgt−1
)η
·
[
k˜t(j)
]α
· [lt(j)]
(1−α) , (17)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is the elasticity of output with respect to private capital, lt(j) denotes the
demand for labor services, k˜t(j) is the demand for capital services and a is TFP. Also, k
g
t−1
is the public capital stock available in period t, which is determined by the government and
is assumed to be productivity-enhancing; the parameter η ∈ [0, 1) measures how influential
public capital is on private production (see Leeper et al., 2010, for a discussion). Intermediate
goods firms acquire labor and capital services in perfectly competitive factor markets at real
(CPI-deflated) prices xt and rkt , respectively. In period t, the real profits of firm j are thus
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given by
PAt(j)
Pt
yt(j)− xt · lt(j)− rkt · k˜t(j). (18)
Cost minimization subject to (17) implies the following factor demand conditions,
rkt = mct · α ·
yt(j)
k˜t(j)
, (19)
xt = mct · (1− α) ·
yt(j)
lt(j)
, (20)
where mct is the real (CPI-deflated) marginal cost common to all intermediate good produc-
ers.4
We assume that intermediate goods firms set nominal prices à la Calvo (1983). Each
period, a randomly chosen fraction θP ∈ [0, 1) of firms cannot re-optimize their price. A firm
that has the chance to reoptimize its price in period t chooses the nominal price PAt(j) that
maximizes
Et
∞
∑
k=0
(βθP)
k λ
o
t+k
λot
[
PAt(j)
Pt+k
− mct+k
]
yt+k(j), (21)
subject to yt+k(j) = (PAt(j)/PAt+k)
− Yt+k. The first-order condition is given by
Et
∞
∑
k=0
(βθP)
k λ
o
t+k
λot
[
P˜At
Pt+k
−

 − 1
mct+k
](
P˜At
PAt+k
)−
Yt+k = 0, (22)
where P˜At is the optimal price chosen by all period-t price setters. The law of motion of the
price level is given by
PAt =
[
θP (PAt−1)
1− + (1− θP)
(
P˜At
)1−]1/(1−) , (23)
or equivalently,
1 = θP
(
1
πAt
)1−
+ (1− θP) p˜1−t ,
where p˜t ≡ P˜At/PAt is the relative (PPI-deflated) optimal price.
2.3 The labor market
Labor firms hire workers from the household sector in order to produce homogenous labor
services, which they sell to intermediate goods producers at the perfectly competitive price
xt. This modelling strategy follows Christoffel et al. (2009) or de Walque et al. (2009). We
4Notice that constant returns to scale in private capital and labor, together with perfectly competitive input
prices, imply that the ratios yt(j)/k˜t(j) and yt(j)/lt(j) are equalized across firms. Combining (17), (19) and
(20), the common real marginal cost can be expressed as
mct =
1
a ·
(
kgt−1
)η ·
(
xt
1− α
)1−α
·
(
rkt
α
)α
.
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keep the conventional assumption of the Pissarides (2000) framework that each labor firm
can at most hire one worker. The production function of each labor firm is linear in the
number of hours worked by its employee, which is fixed at the level h¯. Letting Npt denote
both the fraction of the labor force employed in the private sector and the per-capita number
of labor firms, the total per-capita supply of labor services is given by
Lt = NPt · h¯. (24)
Equilibrium in the market for labor services requires that ωLt =
∫ ω
0 lt(j)dj. Using equations
(16) and (17), together with the fact that the capital-labor ratio is equalized across intermedi-
ate goods firms (k˜t(j)/lt(j) = kt−1/Lt for all j), the above condition can be expressed as
YtDt = a
(
kgt−1
)η
kαt−1L
1−α
t ,
where Dt ≡
∫ ω
0 ω
−1 (PAt(j)/PAt)
− dj is a measure of price dispersion. In what follows, we
will specify the matching process and flows in the labor market, vacancy creation and (pri-
vate) wage determination. Government wages and employment are autonomously chosen
by the fiscal authority (see section 2.4).
2.3.1 Matching process and labor market flows
As already described, we consider a model in which the worker can be in one of three states:
(i) unemployed, (ii) employed in the public sector, or (iii) employed in the private sector. Un-
employment is the residual state in the sense that a worker whose employment relationship
ends flows back into unemployment. Unemployedworkers look for job opportunities. They
find them either in the public sector (with superscript g for government employment) or in
the private sector (with superscript p ). Workers do not direct search to either the public or
the private sector and are, thus, matched randomly. In this sense, the matching process dif-
fers slightly from other papers incorporating public employment in a matching framework
(as, for example, Quadrini and Trigari, 2007; Afonso and Gomes, 2008; or Gomes, 2009). We
apply the three state labor market structure of, for example, Albrecht et al. (2009). While we
follow this approach for simplicity, it should be noted that this assumption does not affect
the results qualitatively.
Let us denote sector-specific per capita employment in period t by N ft , where f =
p, g stands for private and public (i.e. government) employment, respectively.5 The total
employment rate is then given by Ntott = N
p
t + N
g
t , while the unemployment rate is given
by
Ut = 1− Ntott . (25)
Following Blanchard and Galí (2010), we assume that the hiring round takes place at the be-
ginning of each period, and that new hires start producing immediately. We also assume that
5Note that, as we work with household type-specific (un)employment rates for each sector in the households’
budget constraints (see equations (3) and (10)), we basically have to aggregate employment in order to obtain
total (per capita) employment levels across public and private employment. This is done in an analogously
to the aggregation of consumption decisions (see section 2.1.3; again implying that capital letters indicate
aggregate levels). Thus, aggregated per capita employment levels in each sector are given by N ft = (1− μ) ·
n f ,ot + μ · n
f ,r
t . Noting that dismissal and job-finding probabilities are equal across household types, we have
that N ft = n
f ,o
t = n
f ,r
t ; see also Moyen and Stähler (2009) for details.
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workers dismissed at the end of period t − 1 start searching for a new job at the beginning
of period t. Therefore, the pool of searching workers at the beginning of period t is given by
U˜t = Ut−1 + spN
p
t−1 + s
gNgt−1.
The matching process is governed by a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregatematching function
for each sector f = p, g,
Mft = κ
f
e ·
(
U˜t
)ϕ f
·
(
v ft
)(1−ϕ f )
, (26)
where κ fe > 0 is the sector-specific matching efficiency parameter, ϕ f ∈ (0, 1) the sector-
specific matching elasticity and Mft the number of new matches formed in period t resulting
from the total number of searchers and the number of sector-specific vacancies v ft .
6 The
probability for an unemployed worker to find a job in sector f can thus be stated as p ft =
Mft /U˜t, while the probability of filling a vacancy is given by q
f
t = M
f
t /v
f
t . We assume a
constant separation rate in each sector, denoted by s f . The law of motion for sector-specific
employment rates is therefore given by
N ft =
(
1− s f
)
· N ft−1 + p
f
t · U˜t, (27)
for f = g, p. Thus, employment in sector f today is given by yesterday’s employment that
has not been destroyed plus newly created matches in that sector.
2.3.2 Asset value of jobs and wage bargaining
Because of search frictions, formed matches entail economic rents. Firms and workers bar-
gain about their share of the overall match surplus. In order to describe the bargaining
process we first have to derive the asset value functions for workers and firms. We assume
staggered bargaining of nominal wages along the lines of Bodart et al. (2006). In particular,
each period a randomly chosen fraction θw of continuing firms cannot renegotiate wages,
while a fraction θnw of newly created firms does not bargain over wages and simply pays
the average nominal wage of the previous period. Letting W˜pt denote the nominal wage
negotiated in period t, the value function of a firm that renegotiates in that period is given
by
Jt
(
W˜pt
)
= Et
∞
∑
k=0
{
[β · (1− sp) · θw]
k ·
λot+k
λot
·
[
h¯ · xt+k − (1+ τsct+k) ·
W˜pt
Pt+k
]}
+(1− θw) · Et
∞
∑
k=1
{
[β · (1− sp)]k · θk−1w ·
λot+k
λot
· Jt+k
(
W˜pt+k
)}
, (28)
where τsct is the social security contribution rate. Therefore, the value of the firm is the
discounted profit flow in those future states in which it is not allowed to renegotiate (the
term on the right-hand side in the first line of equation 28), plus its continuation value should
6Note that, with the representation above (equation (26)), we are able to calibrate the matching functions across
sectors differently. In the case ϕg < ϕp (the strategy which we will follow), vacancies are relatively more im-
portant than the pool of unemployment in the government sector. We believe this is a plausible assumption.
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it have the chance to reoptimize in the next period (the term in the second line).7 For new
jobs where firm and worker do not bargain, the nominal wage equals last period’s average
nominal wage, Wpt−1, and the value of the job equals
Jt
(
Wpt−1
)
= Jt
(
W˜pt
)
− Et
∞
∑
k=0
{
[β · (1− sp) · θw]
k ·
λot+k
λot
· (1+ τsct+k) ·
Wpt−1 − W˜
p
t
Pt+k
}
.
Opening a vacancy has a real (CPI-deflated) flow cost of κpv . Following Pissarides (2009),
we assume that upon matching the firm incurs a training cost, denoted by κtc. Free entry
into the vacancy posting market drives the expected value of a vacancy to zero. Under our
assumption of instantaneous hiring, real vacancy posting costs, κpv , must equal the time-
t vacancy filling probability, qpt , times the expected value of a filled job in period t net of
training costs. The latter condition can be expressed as
κ
p
v
qpt
+ κtc = (1− θnw) · Jt
(
W˜pt
)
+ θnw · Jt
(
Wpt−1
)
, (29)
where we take into account that the wage of the newly-created job may be optimally bar-
gained with probability 1− θnw.
We can nowderive the asset value functions of workers. In particular, we are interested
in the value of the job in excess of the value of being unemployed, i.e. the worker’s match
surplus. Since different household types use different stochastic discount factors, we must
distinguish between the surplus for an optimizing and a rule-of-thumb household. For a
worker belonging to a type-i household, the surplus value of a job in a renegotiating firm is
given by
Hi,pt
(
W˜pt
)
= Et
∞
∑
k=0
{
[β · (1− sp) · θw]
k ·
λit+k
λit
·
[
(1− τwt+k) ·
W˜pt
Pt+k
− ooi,pt+k
]}
+(1− θw) · Et
∞
∑
k=1
{
[β · (1− sp)]k · θk−1w ·
λit+k
λit
· Hi,pt+k(W˜
p
t+k)
}
, (30)
for i = o, r, where
ooi, ft ≡ κ
B + β(1− s f )Et
λit+1
λit
{
pgt+1H
i,g
t+1
+ppt+1
[
(1− θnw)H
i,p
t+1
(
W˜pt+1
)
+ θnwH
i,p
t+1
(
Wpt
)]}
, (31)
represents the outside option of a type-i worker employed in sector f = p, g at time t. The
latter is the sum of unemployment benefits, κB, and the expected value of searching for a
job in the following period, where p ft+1 is the probability of finding a job in sector f = p, g.
Conditional on landing on a private-sector job ( f = p), the surplus value for the worker
is contingent on whether the firm is allowed to bargain (in which case the worker receives
W˜pt+1) or not (in which case she receives today’s average wage, W
p
t ). In new jobs where the
7Details on how to derive equation (28) can be found in Christoffel et al. (2009) and de Walque et al. (2009) or
sent upon request. An analogous proceeding holds for the workers’ side described below.
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wage is not optimally bargained, the surplus value enjoyed by type-i workers is given by
Hi,pt
(
Wpt−1
)
= Hi,pt
(
W˜pt
)
+ Et
∞
∑
k=0
{
[β · (1− sp) · θw]
k ·
λit+k
λit
· (1− τwt+k) ·
Wpt−1 − W˜
p
t
Pt+k
}
.
Let Hi,gt denote the surplus value of a government job for a type-i worker. As wages there
are autonomously set by the fiscal authority, the asset value function simplifies to
Hi,gt = (1− τ
w
t )w
g
t − oo
i,g
t + β(1− s
g)Et
{
λit+1
λit
· Hi,gt+1
}
, (32)
where wgt is the real wage paid by the government. The only influence of staggered wage
setting in the private sector on the asset value of public employees operates through the
outside option of public sector workers, ooi,gt , given by (31) for f = g. Given the asset value
functions of firms and workers, we are now in a position to describe the wage bargaining
game.
As already mentioned above, we assume unionized wage bargaining following Boscá
et al. (2009a, 2009b, 2010).8 The unions’s utility is the average utility of its members. More
precisely, it is the weighted average of the surplus of optimizing and rule-of-thumb workers,
which we denote by
Ωt ≡ (1− μ)H
o,p
t
(
W˜pt
)
+ μHr,pt
(
W˜pt
)
.
This implies that the union wants to maximize its members’ gain from employment over un-
employment, as in the formulation by Oswald (1993). We assume Nash bargaining between
the firm and the union, where the union’s bargaining power parameter is given by ξ ∈ [0, 1).
The joint maximization problem is, therefore,
max
W˜pt
[Ωt]
ξ [Jt (W˜pt )]1−ξ . (33)
The resulting sharing rule is given by
Ωt =
ξ
1− ξ
·
Et∑∞0
{(
(1− μ)
λot+k
λot
+ μ
λrt+k
λrt
)
[β(1− sp)θw]
k (1−τwt+k)
Pt+k
}
Et∑∞0
{
λot+k
λot
[β(1− sp)θw]
k (1+τsct+k)
Pt+k
} · Jt (W˜pt ) , (34)
which states that the share of the matching surplus the worker receives depends on the
union’s bargaining power and (the expected evolution of) labor income taxes, prices and
household type-specific stochastic discount factors. Solving equation (34) for W˜pt by using
the corresponding asset value functions gives the optimal wage bargained in period t. Fi-
nally, we derive the average real wage in the private sector, wpt ≡ W
p
t /Pt. The latter evolves
8Assuming individual bargaining between each worker with the firm does not change the steady-state results
at all. But it (slightly) changes the magnitude of wage evolution across the cycle. This is due to the fact
that rule-of-thumb households discount differently. The effects are very small, however, and, therefore, we
decided to stick to the assumptions made by Boscá et al. (2009a, 2009b, 2010).
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according to
wpt =
(1− sp)Npt−1
Npt
[
(1− θw)w˜
p
t + θw ·
wpt−1
πt
]
+
MPt
Npt
[
(1− θnw)w˜
p
t + θ
n
w ·
wpt−1
πt
]
, (35)
where w˜pt ≡ W˜
p
t /Pt is the real optimally bargained wage, w
p
t−1/πt = W
p
t−1/Pt is the real
value of yesterday’s average nominal wage at today’s prices, and we have taken into account
the fact that new and continuing jobs pay the optimally bargained wage with probabilities
1− θnw and 1− θw, respectively. Equation (35) can also be expressed as w
p
t = (1− γt)w˜
p
t +
γt · w
p
t−1/πt, where γt ≡ θw + (M
p
t /N
p
t ) · (θ
n
w − θw) (see also Blanchard and Galí, 2007, who
propose a similar equation for real wage rigidity).
2.4 Fiscal authorities
The real (CPI-deflated) per capita value of end-of-period government debt, bt ≡ Bt/Pt,
evolves according to a standard debt accumulation equation,
bt =
Rt−1
πt
bt−1 + PDt,
where PDt denotes real (CPI-deflated) per capita primary deficit. The latter is given by per
capita fiscal expenditures minus per capita fiscal revenues,
PDt =
[
Gt
p1−ω−ψBt
+ κBUt + Subt
]
−
[
(τwt + τ
sc
t )
[
wpt N
P
t + w
g
t N
g
t
]
+ τbt
Rt−1 − 1
πt
bt−1 (36)
+τct Ct + τ
k
t (r
k
t − δ
k)kt−1 + Tt
]
,
where Gt denotes per capita government spending in goods and services expressed in
PPI terms (hence the correction for the CPI-to-PPI ratio, Pt/PAt = p
1−ω−ψ
Bt ). Government
spending in goods and services is in turn the sum of government demand for privately-
produced consumption and investment goods (which we will henceforth refer to as ‘pub-
lic purchases’ and ’public investment’, respectively) and the public sector wage bill (gross
of social security contributions). Following standard practice, we assume full home-bias
in public purchases and public investment, such that their nominal price is equal to the
home country PPI, PAt.9 Letting C
g
t and I
g
t denote real per capita public purchases and
public investment, respectively, we have the following nominal relationship: PAtGt =
PAt
(
Cgt + I
g
t
)
+ (1+ τsct )Ptw
g
t N
g
t . Dividing by PAt and using Pt/PAt = p
1−ω−ψ
Bt , we obtain
Gt = C
g
t + I
g
t +
[
(1+ τsct )w
g
t N
g
t
]
p1−ω−ψBt . (37)
9Full home bias in public consumption and investment is assumed for simplicity and can be justified by the fact
that, for OECD countries, there is evidence for strong home bias in government procurement, much over and
above that observed in private consumption (see, for example, Trionfetti, 2000; and Brulhart and Trionfetti,
2004).
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Given public investment, the stock of public physical capital evolves as follows,
kgt = (1− δ
g)kgt−1 + I
g
t , (38)
where we assume that the public capital stock depreciates at rate δg (which may potentially
deviate from the private-sector depreciation rate).
The government therefore has six instruments on the revenue side: the tax rate on
wage income, τwt , on consumption, τ
c
t , on bond returns, τ
b
t , on capital returns, τ
k
t , the social
security contribution tax rate, τsct , and lump-sum taxes, Tt. It also has five instruments on
the expenditures side: public purchases, Cgt , public investment, I
g
t , public sector wages, w
g
t ,
public employment, Ngt , and lump-sum subsidies, Subt. For the tax rates, we assume a rule
of the form
Xt = X¯ + ρX (Xt−1 − X¯) + (1− ρX) φX · eauxX ·
(
bt−1
Ytott−1
p1−ω−ψBt−1 − ω
b
)
+ Xt , (39)
for X ∈ {τw, τsc, τb, τc, τk}, whereas for all other instruments the assumed rule is
Xt
X¯
=
(
Xt−1
X¯
)ρX
·
(
bt−1
ωbYtott−1
p1−ω−ψBt−1
)(1−ρX)φX
· exp
(
Xt
)
, (40)
for X ∈ {Cg, Ig,wg, Ng, Sub, T}, where X¯ denotes the corresponding long-run target, ρX the
smoothing parameter, bt−1p
1−ω−ψ
Bt−1 /Y
tot
t−1 is the ratio of public debt over GDP in period t − 1
(the home country’s per capita GDP in terms of PPI, Ytott , is defined later), ω
b is a long-run
target for the debt ratio, φX measures the responsiveness of the corresponding instrument
to deviations in the debt ratio from its long-run target, and the Xt is an iid shock. e
aux
X is an
exogenous auxiliary variable for simulation purposes. We assume eauxX = 1 unless explicitly
specified differently. For Cgt and I
g
t , the long-run target is a certain weight of steady-state
GDP: C¯g = ωCgY¯tot, I¯g = ωIGY¯tot. For public sector wages and employment, the long-run
targets are, respectively, a premium over private-sector wages and a share of total employ-
ment in the steady state: w¯g = ωwgw¯p, N¯g = ωngN¯tot. In order to guarantee stability in
the debt ratio, for at least one instrument the coefficient φX must be non-zero (positive for
revenue instruments, negative for expenditure instruments). Notice however that it gen-
erally suffices to assume a small and inertial responsiveness of the chosen instrument(s) to
deviations in the debt ratio.10
10The literature on optimal fiscal policy derives two stylized results. First, it seems preferable to move fiscal
instruments by a small amount permanently to service a new higher level of debt, rather than change them
by a large amount on a temporary basis to return debt to its initial level (see, for example, Schmitt-Grohé
and Uribe, 2007, Kirsanova and Wren-Lewis, 2007, and Canzoneri et al., 2008, among others). This finding
can be related to the tax smoothing argument (see Barro, 1979, and Lucas and Stokey, 1983). Second, mild
countercyclical policy responses have a stabilizing and welfare-enhancing effect (see also Leith and Wren-
Lewis, 2007, Straub and Tchakarov, 2007, or Galí and Monacelli, 2008).
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2.5 The foreign country block, international linkages and union-wide
monetary policy
In this section, we will describe some structural relationships corresponding to the foreign
country block, point out the international linkages via trade in goods and foreign assets, and
describe the union-wide monetary policy rule.
2.5.1 The foreign country
We use asterisks to denote decisions made by foreign agents as well as structural param-
eters in the foreign country. The latter is modelled analogously to the home country. For
this reason, here we discuss only some structural relationships, while the full set of equa-
tions corresponding to the foreign country is analogous to the home country (a full equation
summary is available upon request).
The consumption basket of foreign households is given by
ci∗t =
(
ci∗At
ω − ψ∗
)ω−ψ∗ (
ci∗Bt
1− ω + ψ∗
)1−ω+ψ∗
,
for i = o, r, where ci∗At and c
i∗
Bt denote consumption by foreign type-i households of goods
produced in country A (home) and B (foreign), respectively, while ψ∗ captures the degree
of home bias in foreign households’ preferences. The foreign country’s investment basket is
analogously defined. The corresponding consumer price index in the foreign country (which
is used as numeraire by households and firms in that country) is given by
P∗t = P
ω−ψ∗
At P
1−ω+ψ∗
Bt = PBt
(
1
pBt
)ω−ψ∗
.
Therefore, the foreign country’s before-VAT consumer price inflation evolves according to
π∗t ≡
P∗t
P∗t−1
= πBt
(
pBt−1
pBt
)ω−ψ∗
,
where πBt ≡ PBt/PBt−1 is producer price inflation in the foreign country. The PPI itself
evolves according to
PBt =
(∫ 1−ω
0
1
1− ω
PBt(j)1−
∗
dj
)1/(1−∗)
=
[
θ∗P
(
π
γ∗P
t−1 · PBt−1
)1−∗
+ (1− θ∗P)
(
P˜Bt
)1−∗]1/(1−∗) ,
where P˜Bt is the common nominal price chosen by the foreign country’s price-setters in
period t. Also, the nominal interest rate paid/received by the foreign country’s nationals
on international bonds equals Recbt exp
(
−ψd
(
d∗t − d¯
∗
)
/Y∗t
)
, where (−) d∗t /Y
∗
t is the foreign
country’s ratio of net foreign debt over output.
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2.5.2 International linkages
As already mentioned, international linkages between the two countries result from trade in
goods and services as well as in international bonds. The home country’s net foreign asset
position, expressed in terms of PPI, evolves according to
dt =
Recbt−1 · e
−ψd(dt−1−d¯)/Yt−1
πAt
· dt−1 +
1− ω
ω
(C∗At + I
∗
At)− pBt (CBt + IBt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
= Trade balance
, (41)
where (1− ω) (C∗At + I
∗
At) /ω are real per capita exports and pBt (CBt + IBt) are real per
capita imports. Zero net supply of international bonds implies
ωdt + (1− ω) pBt d
∗
t = 0. (42)
Finally, terms of trade pBt = PBt/PAt evolve according to
pBt =
πBt
πAt
pBt−1. (43)
2.5.3 Equilibrium in goods markets and GDP
Market clearing implies that private per capita production in the home and foreign country,
Yt and Y∗t respectively, is used for private and public consumption as well as private and
public investment demand,
Yt = CAt + IAt + C
g
t + I
g
t +
1− ω
ω
(C∗At + I
∗
At) ,
Y∗t = C
∗
Bt + I
∗
Bt + C
g∗
t + I
g∗
t +
ω
1− ω
(CBt + IBt) .
Consistently with national accounting, each country’s GDP is the sum of private-sector pro-
duction and government production of goods and services. The latter is measured at input
costs, that is, by the gross governmentwage bill. Let Ytott and Y
tot,∗
t denote real (PPI-deflated)
per capita GDP in the home and foreign country, respectively. We then have
Ytott = Yt + (1+ τ
sc
t )w
g
t N
g
t p
1−ω−ψ
Bt , (44)
Ytot,∗t = Y
∗
t + (1+ τ
sc∗
t )w
g∗
t N
g∗
t p
−(ω−ψ∗)
Bt , (45)
where in (45) we have used P∗t /PBt = p
−(ω−ψ∗)
Bt .
2.5.4 Monetary authority
We assume that the area-wide monetary authority has its nominal interest rate, Recbt , respond
to deviations of area-wide after-VAT CPI inflation from its long-run target, π¯, and to area-
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wide GDP growth, according to a simple Taylor rule,
Recbt
R¯ecb
=
(
Recbt−1
R¯ecb
)ρR ⎧⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣(πτct
π¯τ
c
)ω (
πτ
c,∗
t
π¯τ
c,∗
)1−ω⎤⎦φπ
⎡
⎣( Ytott
Ytott−1
)ω (
Ytot,∗t
Ytot,∗t−1
)1−ω⎤⎦φy
⎫⎬
⎭
(1−ρR)
,
where ρR is a smoothing parameter, φπ and φy are the monetary policy’s stance on inflation
and output growth, respectively. This completes the model description. We now turn to the
model calibration.
2.6 Calibration
We calibrate our model to quarterly frequency. We calibrate the home country (A) to the
Spanish economy and the foreign country (B) to the rest of the European Monetary Union.
We set the home country size to ω = 0.10, which roughly corresponds to Spain’s population
share in the EMU. The remaining parameters are calibrated as follows. Some parameters
are chosen such that the model’s deterministic steady state replicates a number of long-run
targets in the data. These long-run targets are displayed in Tables 1 and 2 for the home
(Spain) and foreign (rest of EMU) countries, respectively. The rest of the parameters are
set according to microeconomic evidence as well as following the literature. A summary
of all structural parameters can be found in Table 3. Unless explicitly stated differently, we
assume a symmetric calibration between the home and foreign country. We note in passing
that, given both the long-run targets and the parameters chosen according to micro data and
literature, we are able to analytically solve for the model’s deterministic steady state and for
the parameter values consistent with the long-run targets.
2.6.1 Steady-state ratios and targeted parameters
We normalize per-capita GDP in both countries to one, i.e. Y¯ = Y¯tot∗ = 1 implying the TFP
scaling parameters a and a∗. For the steady-state ratios in the home and foreign country, we
mainly refer to national accounts data from 1999 to 2008. The data comes from the European
Commission (AMECO and Public Finance Report – 2010) and Eurostat (NEW CRONOS). From
the data, we set the steady-state shares of different government spending-to-GDP ratios ac-
cording to Table 1. Furthermore, the ratios of government-granted subsidies and public debt
over GDP are set according to this data.
Regarding the tax rates, we have calculated them as average implicit tax rates accord-
ing to the following procedure: we take the government revenues from a specific tax and
divide it by its corresponding base. This is done for all tax rates except for Spain’s personal
income tax rate, τ¯w (which in the model includes social security contributions by workers),
and the tax rate on returns from public debt τ¯b: the latter is set equal to the former, which in
turn is based on calculations by Argimón et al. (2007) using Spanish fiscal micro data.11
According to Spain’s Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA), an official labor force survey,
the unemployment rate in Spain from 1999 to 2008 averaged U¯ = 11.13%, while the fraction
11Hence, we ignore a tax reform of 2007 under which income from interest payments from public debt and
similar instruments are separated from the rest of the taxpayer’s tax base, and taxed at the marginal rate of
18%. However, the implicit tax rate (including all kinds of reductions, deductions, etc.) is probably much
lower, so it is sensible to set it equal to the personal income tax rate (as it was the case before 2007).
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Table 1: Targeted values (home country: Spain)
Target Symbol Value
PPI inflation π¯A 1.0000
Current account d¯ = −d¯∗ 0.0000
(Average) Labor income tax rate τ¯w 0.1622
Bond tax rate τ¯b 0.1622
VAT rate τ¯c 0.0762
Social security contribution rate τ¯sc 0.1555
Capital tax rate τ¯k 0.1806
Unemployment rate U¯ 0.1113
Fraction of publ. employment f racpub = N¯
g
1−U¯ 0.1872
Vacancy filling rate (private) q¯p 0.7000
Vacancy filling rate (public) q¯g 0.8000
Gov. SS spending ωG = G¯/Y¯tot 0.2131
Gov. SS purchases ωCg = C¯g/Y¯tot 0.0756
Gov. SS investment ω Ig = I¯g/Y¯tot 0.0355
SS debt-to-annual-GDP ratio ωb = p¯1−ω−ψB b¯/(4Y¯
tot) 0.4831
SS subsidy-to-GDP ratio ωs = p¯1−ω−ψB
¯Sub/Y¯tot 0.1543
Replacement ratio rrs = κ
B
(1−τ¯w)w¯ 0.6940
Source: Original data from European Commission, Eurostat and OECD, own calculations for the ratios and
implicit tax rates; normalization as described in the main text.
of public to total employment averaged f racpub = 18.72%. For rest of EMU, we find U¯∗ =
8.44% and f racpub∗ = 18.14%.
The OECD calculates replacement ratios for different types of households (see
www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives) depending on their relative income and other charac-
teristics and calculates a “short-run” replacement ratio (average replacement ratio enjoyed
in the first 12 months of the unemployment spell). We have that the sample averages for
Spain in the period 2001-2008 are 69.4%. For the rest of EMU, an analogous procedure yields
rrs∗ = 70.5%. Following Christoffel et al. (2009), we set the vacancy-filling probabilities in
the private and public sector to q¯p = q¯p,∗ = 0.7 and q¯g = q¯g,∗ = 0.8, respectively.
We normalize steady-state PPI inflation rates to one, π¯A = π¯B = 1, which in turn
implies π¯ = π¯∗ = 1. Furthermore, we set net foreign asset positions to zero, d¯ = d¯∗ = 0,
implying trade balance between both regions in the steady state. The calibration for the
foreign country is performed following a similar strategy and is summarized in Table 2.
2.6.2 Other parameter values
We set the Calvo parameter θP to 0.75, which implies that nominal prices are fixed on average
for four quarters. This is calibrated somewhere in the middle of the range typically reported
in the literature. Coenen et al. (2008) and Smets andWouters (2003) estimate an average price
duration for optimal price setting of ten quarters using full information Bayesian estimation
techniques, while Del Negro et al. (2005) only report an average price duration of three
quarters. Micro-data for the euro area on price setting reports relatively low price durations
with a median of around 3.5 quarters (i.e. close to one year; see Alvarez et al., 2006; for a
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Table 2: Targeted values (rest of EMU)
Target Symbol Value
(Average) Labor income tax rate τ¯w∗ 0.2225
Bond tax rate τ¯b∗ 0.1267
VAT rate τ¯c∗ 0.0995
Social security contribution rate τ¯sc∗ 0.1706
Capital tax rate τ¯k∗ 0.0704
Unemployment rate U¯∗ 0.0844
Fraction of publ. employment f racpub∗ = N¯
g∗
1−U¯∗ 0.1814
Vacancy filling rate (private) q¯p∗ 0.7000
Vacancy filling rate (public) q¯g∗ 0.8000
Gov. SS spending ωG∗ = G¯∗/Y¯tot∗ 0.2256
Gov. SS purchases ωCg∗ = C¯g∗/Y¯tot∗ 0.0985
Gov. SS investment ω Ig∗ = I¯g∗/Y¯tot∗ 0.0238
SS debt-to-GDP ratio (annualized) ωb∗ =
(
p¯∗B
)−(ω−ψ∗) b¯∗/(4Y¯tot∗) 0.6896
SS subsidy-to-GDP ratio ωs∗ =
(
p¯∗B
)−(ω−ψ∗) ¯Sub∗/Y¯tot∗ 0.2126
Replacement ratio rrs∗ = κ
B∗
(1−τ¯w∗)w¯∗ 0.7050
Source: Original data from European Commission, Eurostat and OECD, own calculations for the ratios and
implicit tax rates; normalization as described in the main text.
summary of more recent micro-evidence). The steady-state mark-up of intermediate goods
producers over marginal cost is set at 20 percent, implying that  = 6 as in Blanchard and
Galí (2010). Regarding nominal wage stickiness, Christoffel et al. (2009), Colciago et al.
(2008) and deWalque et al. (2009) find a rather high degree of stickiness forwages on existing
jobs. We opt for a middle value of these studies and set θw = 0.8. According to de Walque
et al. (2009), newly created jobs face a somewhat higher wage flexibility, but are still tied to
existing (previous period’s) wages. Hence, we choose θnw = 0.7.
12
Regarding preference parameters, we choose standard values: β = 0.99, σc = 2 and
h = 0.85 (see, for example, Smets and Wouters, 2003; or Coenen et al., 2008). The home bias
parameter in each country is set such that the share of domestically-produced goods in total
private consumption expenditure equals its empirical counterpart, 66% in Spain and 93% in
the rest of EMU, yielding ψ = 0.56 and ψ∗ = 0.03. For the fraction of liquidity constraint
consumers, we choose μ = 0.4 following Forni et al. (2009).13
According to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), it is sufficient to chose a rather small
value for the risk premium parameter on international bonds in order to generate a stable
equilibrium. So we opt for ψd = ψ∗d = 0.01. For the monetary policy rule, we chose coeffi-
cients associated with a classical Taylor rule (see Taylor, 1993; as well as Woodford, 2001, for
a discussion).
On the production side, we set α = 0.4; the resulting steady-state labor share,
12De Walue et al. (2009) find this by matching their model to fit US data. To us, it seems reasonable that the tie
of new jobs’ wages to existing wages may be even higher in Europe due to a higher degree of collective wage
bargaining.
13We have performed sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter and find that the main results remain
robust. These results are available upon request.
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(1+ τ¯sc)
(
w¯pN¯P + w¯gN¯g
)
p¯1−ω−ψB /Y
tot = 52.9%, is very close to the average labor share in
Spain over the period 1999-2008 (53.8%). Capital, both public and private, depreciates at
rate δg = δp = 0.025. These are standard values in the literature; see, for example, Cooley
and Prescott (1995) or Burda and Weder (2002). We set the elasticity of production with re-
spect to public capital to η = 0.015, which is within the range of estimates in the literature
(see Aschauer, 1989, Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994, Holtz-Eakin, 1994, Kamps, 2004, and the
discussion in Leeper et al., 2010). The investment adjustment cost parameter is chosen to
be κI = 2.48, in line with Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2006). On the labor market, follow-
ing Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), we set the matching elasticity in the private sector to
the standard value of ϕp = 0.5. We, further, follow Afonso and Gomes (2008) in setting
ϕg = 0.3 < ϕp which implies that vacancies are relatively more important for the match-
ing process in the public sector than unemployment. For the separation rates, we chose
sp = 0.06 in line with Christoffel et al. (2009) which is also close to the values in Boscá et al.
(2009a, 2009b, 2010). Again, we follow Afonso and Gomes (2008) and Gomes (2009) who find
that sg = 1/2 · sp. We set the bargaining power equal to private sector matching elasticity,
ξ = ϕp = 0.5 to comply with the condition of Hosios (1990), which is a standard proceeding
in the literature. Following Silva and Toledo (2009), we target training costs to be equal to
55% of a new hire’s quarterly wage, i.e. κtc = 0.55 · w¯p.
The remaining parameters are calculated in order to replicate the steady-state ratios
mentioned above. This yields corresponding values for private-sector and public-sector
matching efficiency κpe and κ
g
e , private-sector vacancy posting costs κ
p
v and unemployment
benefits κB, as well as the corresponding foreign country counterparts.
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Table 3: Baseline parameter calibration
Parameter Symbol Value
Relative size of home country ω 0.1
Monetary policy
Interest rate smoothing ρR 0.9
Stance on inflation φπ 1.5
Stance on output gap φy 0.5
Fiscal policy
Lump-sum tax smoothing ρT = ρ∗T 0
Capital tax smoothing ρτk 0
SSC smoothing† ρτsc 0
VAT smoothing ρτc 0
Bond tax smoothing ρτb 0
Labor income tax smoothing ρτw 0.1
Persistence pub. investment ρIg 0
Persistence government purchases ρCg 0
Persistence public employment ρng 0.85
Persistence public wages ρwg 0
Stance on debt (lump-sum tax) φT = φ∗T 0
Stance on debt (cap. tax) φτk 0
Stance on debt (SSC)† φτsc = φ∗τsc 0
Stance on debt (VAT) φτc 0
Stance on debt (bond tax) φτb 0
Stance on debt (lab. tax)† φτw 0.1
Stance on debt (gov. purchases) φCg 0
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Table 3 (cont.): Baseline parameter calibration
Parameter Symbol Value
Price and wage stickiness
Calvo parameter (prices) θP 0.75
Market power (markup)  6
Calvo parameter (existing wages) θw 0.8
Calvo parameter (new wages) θnw 0.7
Preferences
Share of RoT consumers μ 0.4
Discount rate β 0.99
Risk aversion σc 2
Habits in consumption h 0.85
Home bias ψ; ψ∗ 0.56; 0.03
Trade in internat. bonds
Risk premium parameter ψ2 = ψ∗2 0.01
Production
Private sector capital depreciation δk 0.025
Public sector capital depreciation δg 0.025
Private sector capital share in prod. α 0.4
Public sector capital influence in prod. η 0.015
Adjustment cost parameter κI 2.48
TFP scaling parameter a; a∗ 0.42; 0.45
Labor market
Matching elasticity (private sector) ϕp 0.5
Matching elasticity (public sector) ϕg 0.3
Separation rate (public sector) sg 0.03
Separation rate (private sector) sp 0.06
Bargaining power ξ 0.5
Private sector matching efficiency κpe ; κ
p∗
e 0.44; 0.48
Public sector sector matching efficiency κge ; κ
g∗
e 0.30; 0.32
Vacancy posting costs κv; κ∗v 0.15; 0.03
Training costs κtc, κ∗tc 0.35; 0.26
Unemployment benefits κB; κ∗B 0.37; 0.26
Notes: Parameter values chosen as described in the main text. Fiscal instrument used is labor income tax (hence,
fiscal policy’s stance on debt deviations, φX , are set to zero for all other fiscal instruments) and home and foreign
country parameters are equal (both true unless indicated differently). For the ‘fiscal devaluation’ simulation to
follow, the persistence and stance parameters ρ∗T , ρτsc , and φ
∗
T and φτsc are changed according to the description
in the main text and φτw = φ∗τw = 0 (indicated by
† in the table).
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3 Main analysis
In this section, we describe the main analysis conducted in this paper. In order to do so,
we first describe the simulation design and, then, discuss the short and long-run results,
respectively.
3.1 Simulation design
The main focus of our paper is to analyze short and long-run effects of permanent changes
in a number of fiscal instruments that are aimed at achieving fiscal consolidation. Along the
lines of recent actions taken or announced by the Spanish government, the instruments we
consider are public wages, public employment, government purchases and public invest-
ment on the expenditure side, as well as VAT and labor income tax rates on the revenue side.
In order to make them comparable, we calibrate the change in each fiscal instrument such
that the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio falls by one percentage point ex ante, that is, holding
constant everything other than the instrument being changed. For simplicity, we assume
that at the time of the fiscal change the economy is in steady state. Therefore, when calcu-
lating ex-ante effects, all variables are set equal to their baseline steady state values. The
primary deficit to GDP ratio is given by
PDratiot =
PDt
Ytott
· p1−ω−ψBt , (46)
where primary deficit PDt is defined in equation (36). Notice that, since PDt and Ytott are
expressed in terms of CPI and PPI, respectively, we adjust the ratio of both variables by
the CPI-to-PPI ratio, Pt/PAt = p
1−ω−ψ
Bt . From equation (46), the change in primary deficit
required to bring about a one percentage point reduction in the deficit ratio ex-ante is given
by
d(PD) = −0.01 · Y¯tot (1/ p¯B)
1−ω−ψ , (47)
where bars denote baseline steady state values. From the definition of real primary deficit,
equation (36), we can then calculate the necessary change in the corresponding fiscal instru-
ment. In the case of a change in consumption taxes, ceteris paribus the change in primary
deficit equals d(PD) = −d(τc)C¯. Combining this with (47), we then have
d(τc) = 0.01 ·
(
p¯1−ω−ψB C¯
Y¯tot
)−1
,
where ( p¯1−ω−ψB C¯)/Y¯
tot is the share of private consumption in GDP. In the case of a change
in wage income taxes, similar calculations yield
d(τw) = 0.01 ·
(
p¯1−ω−ψB N¯
totw¯
Y¯tot
)−1
,
where w¯ ≡
(
N¯p/N¯tot
)
w¯p +
(
N¯g/N¯tot
)
w¯g is the economy-wide average real wage. For PPI-
deflated expenditure instruments, the required percentage change is given by d(X)/X¯ =
−0.01
(
X¯/Y¯tot
)−1, for X = Cg, Ig. Finally, the required percentage changes in public wages
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or public employment are given by
d(X)
X¯
= −0.01
(
p¯1−ω−ψB (1− τ¯
w) w¯gN¯g
Y¯tot
)−1
,
for X = wg, Ng, where we have taken into account the fact that changes in either instrument
have a direct effect both on public consumption and on tax receipts (see equations 36 and
37).
Each fiscal measure is implemented by changing the corresponding long-run target, X¯,
such that the measure is permanent. For instance, in the case of the consumption tax rate, the
new long-run target is given by (τ¯c)′ = τ¯c + 0.01( p¯1−ω−ψB C¯/Y¯
tot)−1; for public purchases, it
is given by C¯′ = C¯[1− 0.01
(
X¯/Y¯tot
)−1
]. Furthermore, we assume that the actual instrument
Xt reacts immediately, by setting the smoothing coefficients in the fiscal rules to zero except
for the labor income tax rate as we set ρτw > 0 and for the drop in public employment,
which is implemented gradually by assuming a positive autocorrelation coefficient in the
public employment rule (see Table 3). Given that, because of labor market regulations, public
employment cannot be reduced immediately in praxis either, we believe this to be a realistic
feature of our model.
As discussed in the description of the fiscal block, in order to guarantee stability of
public debt at least one fiscal instrument must eventually react to deviations of the public
debt ratio from a long-run target; that is, in the set of fiscal rules described by (39) and (40),
for at least one instrument X we must have φX = 0. We assume the tax rate on labor income
to be that instrument (i.e. we set φτw > 0). Furthermore, we assume that labor income taxes
react to the change in the debt ratio with a 4-year delay (i.e., in equation (39), we set eauxτw = 0
for t = 1, ..., 16 and eauxτw = 1 thereafter), so as to isolate the short-run response of public
deficit and debt from the fiscal rule.
3.2 Expenditure components
We start our analysis by having a look at the effects of a permanent reduction in government
purchases, C¯g. While ourmodel is able to differentiate betweendifferent public consumption
components, this corresponds to how reductions in government consumption are tradition-
ally analyzed in conventional models. For all simulations to follow in this section, we plot
the dynamics for the first 5 years, i.e. 4 years in which the fiscal rule has been shut off plus
the first year in which it is activated again.
We see in Figure 1 that lower government purchases reduce private output and, thus,
GDP. Remember that the entire cut in public purchases takes place immediately so there is no
gradual change. Hence, there is an immediate and rather large drop in private production
and GDP due to lower public demand. Optimizing households increase consumption be-
cause of the positive wealth effect induced by expected future tax decreases associated to the
lower level of government spending today (and, thus, lower levels of debt tomorrow). The
increase in private demand alleviates the drop in public demand such that private produc-
tion as well as GDP start to increase when Ricardian households start to consume more. The
fall in aggregate demand makes firms, first, decrease prices generating deflationary pressure
and, second, decrease production implying less labor and capital demand. Thus, private
employment falls and unemployment rises. As in Galí et al. (2007), liquidity-constrained
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households decrease consumption because they are not subject to the positive wealth effect
but only suffer the income loss due to the fall in employment. The average private-sector
real wage increases on impact, because the fall in consumer prices dominates the fall in nom-
inal wages, but this is not sufficient to compensate for the reduced employment level among
rule-of-thumb households. As consumer price inflation returns to baseline, real wages start
falling due to the persistent decrease in workers’ re-employment probability and hence in
their reservation wage (i.e. the their fall-back utility). Because optimizing households make
up the majority of total population, aggregate private consumption increases through the
wealth effect. Private-sector unit labor costs, (1+ τsct )w
p
t N
p
t /Yt, decrease on impact, because
the drop in private employment is large enough to dominate the initial real wage increase
and the fall in private output. Lower production also implies a fall in capital demand and,
thus, private investment. The drop in unit labor costs and hence in producer prices leads to
an increase in the terms of trade, i.e. home goods become relatively cheaper, which in turn
yields an increase in real net exports. The fiscal balances improve as can be noticed by the
decrease in both the primary deficit-to-GDP and the debt-to-GDP ratios. The initial (though
small) increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio is due to the fact that the denominator of the ratio
sharply decreases on impact, while the nominator gradually adapts. In the discussion on fis-
cal multipliers, the effects just described are, generally, understood to typically accompany
public spending multipliers (see, among others, Cogan et al. 2009; Coenen et al., 2010a; and
Hebous, 2010). We will see below and in Table 5, however, that, when talking about the size
of (not only long-run) fiscal spending multipliers, it matters which spending component we
actually consider. From period 17 onward, the labor income tax rule comes into play. We see
that this fosters private production and private demand. As the effects are opposite to a labor
income tax increase, which is described later on, we refer to the corresponding simulation in
the following subsection for more details.
Figure 2 summarizes the dynamic effects of a gradual cut in public employment for se-
lected variables. We note that, while the effects on private consumption and fiscal balances
tend to be quite similar, there are notable differences in the dynamics of private production,
GDP, employment and private investment. Furthermore, all the effects differ in size. This
is because the two measures – even though both decreasing public consumption – produce
different adjustment paths. Reducing the level of public employment implies an increase
in unemployment and, thus, a decrease in the probability for unemployed workers find-
ing a job in both the public and also the private sector. This yields a reduction in average
private sector wages and, thus, unit labor costs immediately. Lower unit labor costs allow
firms to cut prices, now more persistently, which improves the terms of trade, fosters de-
mand for Spanish goods in the rest of EMU and, thus, increases exports. In contrast to a
cut in government purchases, higher (internal but also export-driven) private demand, now
without a loss of public demand, makes private firms increase production. They do so by
increasing private employment and, eventually, higher private capital input. The unem-
ployment rate still increases as the additional private employment cannot compensate for
the loss in public employment. The initial fall in investment can be explained by the rise of
the real interest rate, which in turn is due to the fall in home CPI inflation together with the
limited influence of Spanish aggregates on area-wide nominal interest rate policy. Higher
private employment and production, however, augment marginal productivity of capital
and, eventually, compensates for this effect generating an increase in private investment.
Because of lower private wages, less public employment and an increase in unemployment,
consumption of RoT households falls, while it increases for optimizing households due to
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 36 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1110
Figure 1: Permanent reduction in home government purchases
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent reduction in
government purchases. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage
point deviations for tax rates, interest rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios).
anticipation of lower future taxation; the latter effect dominates, and thus total private con-
sumption rises. Overall, the effects of a reduction in public employment are similar to those
of a reduction in public purchases. The most significant difference between both measures
is the fact that, when reducing public employment, private production increases while it de-
creases when cutting government purchases. Another noteworthy issue is the fact that GDP
falls when shedding public employment. The effect on private production is mainly due to
the wage reduction just described. The effect on GDP is due to the definition of real GDP
itself, namely the sum of private production and government production (measured as the
public sector wage bill). The latter falls when dismissing public sector workers. Because pri-
vate production increases along the transition path, so does GDP eventually (see also Table
5). We should bear in mind, however, that this is basically a matter of definition because
public sector production is measured by its inputs (according to national accounting). Per-
haps more important is the positive spillover effects that this measure has on private sector
output and employment, which differ from the effects of a cut in public purchases. How-
ever, we should also note that, in our model, we neglect any potentially positive (say, for
instance, private productivity-enhancing) spillover from public employment to the private
sector. Government services only enter households’ utility. As it is not clear how much pub-
lic employment (positively) affects private sector production, we chose to abstract from this
issue. Nevertheless, the positive effects of public sector employment cuts found here are
certainly diminished in practice (or may even vanish when public employment reduction is
misplaced).
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Figure 2: Permanent reduction in home government employment
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent reduction in
public employment. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage
point deviations for tax rates, interest rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios).
Besides reducing the public sector wage bill by dismissing public employees, the gov-
ernment can also decide to cut public wages. The effects of this measure are shown in Figure
3. Cutting public sector wage payments reduces private sector wage claims and, thus, unit
labor costs. Under this measure, the workers’ fall-back utility is not influenced by a lower
probability of finding a job in the public sector, but by the fact that, when having found a
job in the public sector, the corresponding gain is less. Again, lower labor costs allows firms
to cut prices, which improves the terms of trade and fosters exports to the rest of EMU. The
higher demand for Spanish goods is produced with more employment and more capital
inputs, the latter increasing investment eventually. Furthermore, as there are no workers
laid off in this scenario, the increase in private employment now significantly reduces un-
employment. Regarding the consumption reaction of liquidity-constrained consumers, the
reduction in unemployment is not sufficient to compensate for the reduction in public and
private sector wages, while, again, consumption for optimizing households increases yield-
ing a rise in aggregate consumption. Therefore, we find a cut in public sector wages to be
beneficial for private sector output and for both private sector and total employment. Now,
GDP increases because the GDP-deflator takes care of the public sector wage reduction. Our
simulations suggest that cutting public sector wages is, in the short and long-run, the most
efficient consolidation strategy in terms of economic activity, i.e. production and employ-
ment (see also Table 5). However, again, we must point to some caveats regarding this find-
ing. Cutting public sector wages (too much) may imply that the public sector no longer finds
(qualified enough) workers to do the relevant tasks, or that public sector workers would no
longer provide the necessary effort (a possibility the literature on efficiency wages points to).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1110
In both cases, the provision of public services may be affected. Given that public services en-
ter the households’ utility, such measures may not necessarily be welfare-enhancing even
though they increase economic activity. Furthermore, our model neglects the possibility that
government services indirectly foster private-sector productivity.
Figure 3: Permanent reduction in home government wages
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent reduction in
public wages. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage point
deviations for tax rates, interest rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios).
Another deficit-reducing measure recently approved in Spain is an important cut in
public investment. The model-simulated effects from such a measure can be seen in Fig-
ure 4. A decrease in public investment impacts the economy through two different angles.
While the reduction for public investment demand as such affects the economy in an analo-
gous way to the reduction in public purchases discussed before, the cut in public investment
additionally affects private sector productivity through a gradual decline in the public cap-
ital stock. In this respect, the cut in public investment acts analogously to a permanent
(but lagged) negative productivity shock. Overall, the short run effects on output, employ-
ment, international competitiveness, etc., are quantitatively similar to those of a cut in pub-
lic purchases (see Figure 1), although the contractionary effects are slightly larger due to
the additional productivity channel. As can be seen in Table 4, the difference in contrac-
tionary effects between both measures widens as time goes by and the gradual deterioration
in private-sector productivity starts dominating. Our subsequent analysis of steady-state
results in section 3.5 will show that public investment cuts have far more damaging long-
run effects than comparable cuts in public purchases, despite our choice of a relatively small
public capital elasticity (the parameter η in equation (17)).
Drawing some preliminary conclusions from the above analysis, we see that, when
considering government expenditures to be the instrument used for fiscal consolidation, it
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Figure 4: Permanent reduction in home government investment
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent reduction in
government investment. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage
point deviations for tax rates, interest rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios).
matters which spending component is cut. A reduction in productivity-enhancing govern-
ment spending (i.e. public investment) seems to be the more harmful option in terms of
economic activity, due to its direct effect on aggregate demand and its negative effects on
private-sector productivity (the latter especially in the long-run). Decreasing public con-
sumption seems to be less harmful in terms of production and employment. This is es-
pecially so for reductions in public sector wages or public sector employment: first, they do
not directly affect demand for private-sector goods; and second, the resulting fall of workers’
outside option allows firms to reduce unit labor costs and thus improve their international
competitiveness.
3.3 Revenue components
In this section, we analyze the effects of an increase in labor income taxation and the VAT
rate. Figure 5 shows the effects of a permanent increase in the labor income tax rate. An
increase in the labor income tax rate implies a decrease in the take-home pay which yields a
large fall in the consumption of RoT households. Optimizing households, even though in-
creasing consumption because of the positive long-run wealth effect, cannot compensate for
this drop. Less demand yields a drop in private production and GDP, which implies a fall in
employment (hence, an increase in unemployment). There are two effects on private-sector
real wages. First, the increase in unemployment implies a lower job-finding probability and
thus reduced wage claims by workers; second, workers claim higher gross wages because
the increase in taxation reduces their take-home pay. Overall, both effects tend to offset
each other, implying negligible effects on real wages and unit labor costs. While exports
are barely affected, imports fall due to the drop in domestic consumption demand, which
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is partly satisfied by foreign products. Investment increases gradually due to the fall in the
ex-ante real interest rates (notice that expected price inflation actually rises as of the impact
period, whereas nominal interest rates are barely affected). When the labor income tax rules
takes effect after 4 years, we basically observe opposite reactions. However, as the tax rule
entails some smoothing, these effects take a while to be completed (see Table 5 for the long-
run results).
Figure 5: Labor income taxes
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent increase in the
labor income tax rate. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage
point deviations for tax rates, interest rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios).
The effects of a permanent increase in the VAT rate are pictured in Figure 6. Aug-
menting VAT sets in train some of the mechanisms described above. As goods and services
become more expensive, liquidity-constrained consumers will reduce consumption, while
optimizing households slightly increase it due to the wealth effect. As Ricardian households
cannot compensate for the drop of RoT consumption, this implies a reduction in private
consumption demand and a drop in output, yielding lower labor demand and an increase
in unemployment. Private-sector real wages drop slightly, due to the increase in unem-
ployment and the resulting fall in the job-finding probability. In addition, average worker
productivity rises because the fall in private employment is larger than the fall in private-
sector production. Both effects produce a reduction in unit labor costs and thus in home PPI
inflation, with the resulting improvements in the terms of trade and real net exports. Private
investment increases gradually for the same reasons as in the case of the hike in labor income
taxation. Finally, after-VAT CPI inflation experiences a large increase, whereas before-VAT
CPI inflation (not shown in the figure) decreases slightly. Overall, the effects of the increase
in indirect taxation are similar although slightly smaller than those following a rise in labor
income taxation (see also Table 4).
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Figure 6: Value added taxes
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent increase in
the VA tax rate. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage point
deviations for tax rates, interest rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios). Note
that CPI inflation is after-VAT.
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3.4 Magnitude of short-run impact
In table 4, we present a summary of the ex-ante short-run multipliers of each consolida-
tion measure described above. As the table makes clear, a cut in public investment is the
most damaging way of performing fiscal consolidation, as it implies the largest losses in
real GDP and the largest increases in the unemployment rate. A cut in public purchases
follows closely, especially in the very-short run, when the direct effect of both measures
on aggregate demand remains the dominant force. As time goes by, however, the negative
effect of the gradual decline in public capital on private-sector productivity starts widen-
ing the difference in contractionary effects. On the opposite extreme, cuts in public sector
wages or employment actually have positive spillover effects on private-sector output and
employment. The reasons is twofold. First, the government wage bill is not a component of
aggregate demand for domestic privately-produced goods and services and hence does not
directly affect it. Second, both measures worsen the outside option of private-sector work-
ers in wage negotiations, which allows firms to lower their labor costs and thus improve
their international competitiveness. Both measures differ in their effects on total employ-
ment: whereas cutting government wages raises both private-sector and total employment,
the reduction in public employment dominates its positive spillover effect on private-sector
employment, implying an increase in unemployment. Notice also that, unlike the public
wage cuts (which mainly affect the GDP deflator), the fall in public employment implies a
reduction in real government output and hence in real GDP. Finally, the two revenue mea-
sures (an increase in labor income taxes and consumption taxes) fall somewhere in between,
as they imply relatively modest contractionary effects. As discussed before, the bargaining
process in the present framework may act towards dampening the effect of distortionary
taxation on private-sector wage claims and thus on production and employment.
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Table 4: Short-run multipliers
Effects of (instrument) on Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Public purchases
Real GDP -0.61 -0.39 -0.29 -0.24
CPI inflation -0.53 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04
Real private consumption 0.26 0.58 0.74 0.81
Unemployment 0.78 0.49 0.35 0.28
Terms of Trade 0.74 0.95 0.99 1.01
Public employment
Real GDP -0.30 -0.44 -0.41 -0.34
Real priv. production 0.20 0.55 0.83 1.03
CPI inflation -0.18 -0.14 -0.07 -0.07
Real private consumption 0.18 0.41 0.56 0.65
Unemployment 0.53 0.83 0.86 0.85
Private-sector employment 0.24 0.68 1.01 1.22
Terms of Trade 0.29 0.70 0.95 1.12
Public wages
Real GDP 0.38 1.10 1.55 1.83
CPI inflation -0.63 -0.23 -0.12 -0.14
Real private consumption -0.14 0.43 0.75 0.93
Unemployment -0.53 -1.47 -1.99 -2.25
Terms of Trade 0.86 1.60 1.98 2.27
Public investment
Real GDP -0.63 -0.45 -0.38 -0.36
CPI inflation -0.53 -0.04 0.00 -0.04
Real private consumption 0.19 0.44 0.55 0.59
Unemployment 0.80 0.51 0.38 0.32
Terms of Trade 0.72 0.88 0.88 0.86
Labor income taxes
Real GDP -0.16 -0.18 -0.23 -0.31
CPI inflation -0.01 0.06 0.01 -0.04
Real private consumption -0.61 -0.58 -0.58 -0.62
Unemployment 0.22 0.27 0.38 0.50
Terms of Trade -0.01 -0.15 -0.22 -0.23
VAT
Real GDP -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04
CPI inflation 1.45 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05
Real private consumption -0.42 -0.38 -0.37 -0.40
Unemployment 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.12
Terms of Trade 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11
Source: The table shows annual averages of percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage point
deviations for unemployment and inflation rates). CPI inflation is after VAT and in annualized terms.
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3.5 Long-run effects
Table 5 reports the steady-state effects of the different fiscal measures discussed before. We
will henceforth refer to such steady-state changes as the ’long-run’ effects of our fiscal mea-
sures. The table presents percentage deviation from the initial steady state for selected vari-
ables (percentage point deviations for any X-to-GDP ratio, inflation, interest rates and tax
rates). The long-run effects are the result both of the permanent change in the correspond-
ing fiscal instrument and of the long-run reduction in the labor income tax rate implied by
our fiscal rule (see section 3.1). The latter effect can be thought of as the long-run benefit of
fiscal consolidation. The long-run saving in interest payments on outstanding public debt
could alternatively be used to decrease other distortionary taxes (such as consumption taxes
or social security contributions), or to increase some expenditure component. As is stressed
in Coenen et al. (2010b), the long-run benefits of fiscal consolidation depend to some extent
on what is done with the additional proceeds resulting from lower interest payments on
outstanding debt.14
The following findings stand out. Of all themeasures considered, the reduction in pub-
lic investment (Ig) is the only one that implies a long-run contraction in real GDP, whereas
it implies the lowest reduction in the unemployment rate. Therefore, the long-run negative
effect on private-sector productivity seems to be dominating the beneficial effects of reduced
taxation on labor income. Furthermore, it is the measure with the smallest long-run impact
on the public debt-to-GDP ratio. On the contrary, the reduction in public purchases (Cg)
has positive effects on real GDP, implying that the reduction in distortionary taxation domi-
nates in the long-run. On the other extreme, cuts in public sector wages seem to produce the
best outcomes in terms of real GDP increases and reductions in the unemployment rate. In
this case, the long-run fall in distortionary labor income taxation only reinforces the positive
spillover effects of this measure on the international competitiveness of the private sector. It
also implies the largest fall in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The reduction on public employment
follows next in terms of real GDP increases and debt reduction, although to a notable dis-
tance. Regarding consolidation on the revenue side, we see the long-run effects of increase in
labor income taxation and VAT fall somewhere in between, although the VAT rise generally
produces better outcomes thanks to a larger reduction in the labor income tax rate.
Summing up, a reduction in public wages – with the caveats described in the previous
section to be borne in mind – seems to be the preferred choice for the purpose of fiscal
consolidation, in terms of its long-run beneficial effects on employment and production.
Also, a reduction in public employment, a decrease in government purchases as well as
increases in VAT and labor income tax rates seem to produce relatively benign long-term
outcomes. A cut in public investment, however, is likely to be a less desirable choice given its
long-run negative effects on private-sector productivity. This holds unless what is declared
to be investment in national accounting is not productivity-enhancing and should rather
belong to public purchases in terms of our model.
14The ESCB’s WGEM conducted various fiscal policy experiments in different DSGE models (including FiMod).
A common finding in all these models was that using labor income taxes as the (final) fiscal instrument to
take care of the lower interest payments resulting from reduced debt-to-GDP ratios is most beneficial. Hence,
the gains reported here are, in this respect, likely to be the highest gains that can be achieved in this class of
model.
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Table 5: Long-run results of different fiscal measures
Measure / ΔC¯g Δτ¯c Δw¯g
Effect on Δτ¯w ΔN¯g Δ I¯g
Real GDP 0.22 0.13 0.69 1.07 3.80 -0.71
Real private-sector output 0.30 0.15 0.79 2.83 4.35 -0.79
Real private consumption 1.58 0.13 0.66 2.33 3.60 0.69
Real private investment -0.21 0.10 0.51 1.79 2.78 -0.89
Real exports 1.56 0.17 0.88 3.11 4.83 0.36
Real imports 0.19 0.02 0.11 0.37 0.57 0.05
Unemployment -0.40 -0.13 -0.68 -0.17 -3.76 -0.07
Av private real wage -0.86 -0.11 -0.55 -1.66 -3.10 -1.06
Real unit labor costs -0.55 -0.07 -0.38 -1.06 -2.19 -0.17
Terms of trade 1.37 0.15 0.77 2.73 4.23 0.32
Debt/GDP (annualised) -7.96 -7.02 -8.67 -9.90 -18.05 -6.33
Deficit/GDP 0.22 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.50 0.18
Primary Deficit/GDP 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.37 0.67 0.23
Long-run dτ¯w -3.19 -0.62 -3.47 -3.96 -7.22 -2.53
Source: Shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage point deviations for tax rates, interest
rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios).
4 Additional analysis: simulating fiscal devaluation
In this section, we conduct simulations aimed at illustrating some of the additional model
applications. Closely related to the discussion in the previous section, we simulate the sit-
uation in which the VAT rate is permanently increased in order to decrease social security
contributions. Hence, we do not use labor income taxes to sap the proceeds resulting from
savings on interest payments on outstanding debt, but adjust instead social security contri-
butions immediately. Such a measure is discussed in several countries (and has partly been
carried out in Germany in 2007) and is interpreted as a way of performing “fiscal devalua-
tion” inside a monetary union. We will address the spillovers of this measure o the rest of
EMU.
It is well-known that the structure of taxation differs significantly between European
countries. Some rely more on direct taxation, while others use indirect taxation such as the
consumption tax in our model to finance government expenditures. There is an ongoing de-
bate on whether output and employment prospects of a country can be improved by shifting
the tax structure from direct (i.e. labor/income) to indirect (i.e. consumption) taxation; see
European Commission (2008). Germany has been criticized for improving its international
competitiveness at the cost of other member states by increasing the VAT rate by three per-
centage points while simultaneously lowering the social security contributions in 2007. It
has to be noted, however, that revenues resulting from only one percentage point of the VAT
increase were used to lower social security contributions, the rest was used for consolidation
purposes.
In FiMod, we simulate the effects that occur when a similar policy measure is con-
ducted in Spain. We assume that the VAT rate is permanently increased such that the pri-
mary deficit-to-GDP ratio is decreased by one percentage point ex ante as described in Sec-
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tion 3.1. Instead of using the savings in interest payments on outstanding debt to decrease
labor income taxes, we now reduce social security contributions in the home country (Spain).
Social security contribution immediately adapt to the deviations of the targeted debt-to-GDP
ratio. This implies that, as the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases, social security contribution do
so as well. In terms of our model, we assume that, in the home country (Spain), the fiscal
instrument used are social security contributions with ρτsc = 0 (no smoothing) and φτsc = 1
(high stance on deviations of debt from target); see equation (39). The foreign country (rest
of EMU), uses lump sum taxes as fiscal instrument. Figure 7 shows the transitional dynam-
ics of selected variables in Spain, while Figure 8 shows the same transitional dynamics in the
rest of EMU in order to analyze spillovers. Long-run effects are summarized in Table 6.
Before describing the effects, we have to note that the exercise should be considered as
an illustrative example for what FiMod predicts to happen when Spain conducts this mea-
sure. As has been shown by Lipin´ska and von Thadden (2009), the effects – especially the
spillovers to the other country – depend considerably on the size of the home country, on the
speed of adjustment in other fiscal variables, on the foreign asset positions, on the monetary
policy associated with such a measure and on whether the shift is anticipated or not. We
abstract from a detailed robustness analysis as the issue is not the main focus of our paper.
Interested readers are, however, referred to Lipin´ska and von Thadden (2009).
Figure 7: Effects of fiscal devaluation (Spain)
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent increase in the
VAT rate to reduce social security contributions. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial
steady state (percentage point deviations for interest rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios as well as
the tax rate itself). Note that CPI inflation is after-VAT.
We see in Figure 7 that the increase in the VAT rate in Spain induces RoT households
to consume less, which is not surprising as consumption goods become more expensive.
Anticipating the positive wealth effect already described, Ricardian households immedi-
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ately increase consumption. Output increases gradually towards its new steady-state value,
thanks to the increase in domestic demand for home goods as well as in exports. As the
increase in VAT is used to reduce decrease social security contributions, this reduces unit
labor costs inducing firms to employ more workers. Lower unemployment increases the
workers’ fall-back position in the bargaining process making them demand higher wages.
Higher wages and less unemployment eventually reverse the initial drop RoT households’
consumption. Lower unit labor costs allows firms to reduce prices (PPI inflation falls) which
increases the terms of trade and fosters exports because, in relative terms, Spanish goods
become cheaper. This also reduces imports on impact but, as consumption and investment
demand eventually increase, imports start to increase too. Higher production and more em-
ployment increases marginal capital productivity and, thus, private investment. The fiscal
position of Spain, especially the debt-to-GDP ratio, improves even though social security
rates are decreased.15
Figure 8: Effects of fiscal devaluation (rest of EMU)
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Notes: Transition dynamics of selected home country variables following a permanent increase in the
VAT rate to reduce social security contributions. The figure shows percentage deviations from initial
steady state (percentage point deviations for interest rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios as well as
the tax rate itself).
The rest of EMU is influenced by the measure conducted in Spain mainly through two
channels, which can be retraced in Figure 8. First, monetary policy increases the policy rate
15Note that this is partly due to the simulation design. As we did not change the long-run target for the social
security contribution rate τ¯sc nor the targeted debt-to-GDP ratio ωb, the rule itself (and its parameters) influ-
ences the final social security rate and, thus, the final debt-to-GDP ratio in the new steady-state. One could
change the simulation design such that a differently determined final steady-state social security rate and/or
debt-to-GDP ratio is reached. This influences the long-run equilibrium and also the dynamics potentially. As
the question of fiscal devaluation is not the main focus of our paper, however, we neglect a more detailed
analysis of this issue.
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and, second, trade is affected because Spain has improved its international competitiveness
(i.e. exports to Spain fall while imports from Spain increase). On impact, output in the rest
of EMU stays fairly constant and, then, starts to increase even though Spain has increased
its competitiveness. The increase can be explained by the eventual increase in demand for
rest-of-EMU products in Spain. As (purchasing) prices for Spanish goods fall in the rest
of EMU, those consumers can devote some of these consumption expenditures to home
country goods. This holds for RoT and optimizing households, while the latter augment
consumption more anticipating the positive spillovers. This also makes them invest more.
Higher demand for goods implies an increase in production and, thus, employment which,
in turn, increases wages and unit labor costs. The latter increase more as the additional wage
costs and higher employment overcompensate the increase in production. Fiscal balances in
the rest of EMU increase. Compared to Spain, the effects are relatively small. Note, however,
that these positive spillovers and the magnitude of the effects depend on home country size
and the degree of home bias in consumer preferences. We will discuss this issue at the end
of the section.
Table 6: Long-run effects of fiscal devaluation conducted in Spain
Spain
Rest of EMU
Real GDP 2.31 0.40
Real private consumption 2.25 0.72
Real private investment 1.76 0.62
Real exports 2.94 0.52
Real imports 0.52 2.94
Unemployment -2.26 -0.25
Av private real wage 4.84 0.29
Real unit labor costs -1.23 0.18
Terms of trade 2.41 -2.35
Debt/GDP (annualized) -1.82 -0.14
Deficit/GDP 0.05 0.00
Primary Deficit/GDP 0.07 0.01
dτsc -7.27 n.a.
dτ¯c 1.75 n.a.
Change in lump-sum tax n.a. -0.71
Source: The figure shows percentage deviations from initial steady state (percentage point deviations for tax
rates, interest rates, (un)employment rates, inflation and X-to-GDP ratios).
Our simulation suggests that, in the long-run, the shift in the Spanish tax structure
by relying more on indirect taxation and decreasing social security contributions primarily
improves Spain’s economic situation, while the effects on the rest of EMU are generally very
small – but positive, too (see Table 6). So, for a (relatively small) single country, fiscal de-
valuation as just described fosters economic prospects according to our model. However,
we must again stress that the effects are sensitive to country size, the home bias, the precise
simulation design and the parametrization of the fiscal rule(s). Furthermore, in our baseline
calibration, we find that Spain is relatively less competitive with respect to the rest of EMU
(i.e. p¯B < 1). Increasing competitiveness here through “fiscal devaluation” also implies that,
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1110
because of lower prices for Spanish goods, consumption opportunities for rest of EMU in
their own country citizens can be improved due to “overall efficiency gains”. If we would
consider a larger country which is already more competitive than the rest of EMU and has
potentially less home bias, the positive spillovers found here could change sign. A more
profound analysis of this question, also in our model, is certainly interesting but is beyond
the scope of our paper. We should also bear in mind that the simulations shown here do not
include strategic interaction of the rest of EMU-countries with policy measures conducted in
Spain – an issue that certainly becomes the more important the larger the economy conduct-
ing fiscal devaluation is. Again, the reader is referred to Lipin´ska and von Thadden (2009)
for a more detailed discussion.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of a two-
countrymonetary union economywith a comprehensive fiscal block. Our model is primarily
aimed at simulating the effects of fiscal policy measures by relatively large countries (such
as Germany, France, Italy or Spain) in a monetary union such as the Euro Area. We provide
a notable degree of disaggregation on the fiscal expenditures side, explicitly distinguishing
between (productivity-enhancing) public investment, public purchases, and the public sec-
tor wage bill. We also consider a wide range of taxes on the fiscal revenues side. The model
incorporates various other realistic features such as frictional labor markets and equilibrium
unemployment, staggered price setting and wage bargaining in the private sector, liquidity-
constrained households, habit formation, and investment adjustment costs. It is calibrated
for Spain and the rest of the Euro Area, but it can easily be re-calibrated for other member
states.
Inspired by recent fiscal actions and announcements in Spain, we simulate a number
of policy measures aimed at achieving fiscal consolidation. We find that using cuts in public
investment is probably the less desirable way of performing fiscal consolidation, in terms
of both its short-run and long-run effects on economic activity. The effects of public con-
sumption cuts depend on which specific measure is taken: whereas cuts in public purchases
tend to be relatively harmful in the short-run due to its direct effect on aggregate demand,
reductions in public sector wages or employment have positive spillover effects on the pri-
vate sector thanks to lower labor costs and improved international competitiveness. Finally,
we find that, in a labor market characterized by matching frictions and wage bargaining,
increases in labor income or consumption taxes do not seem to affect production and output
as much as they do in conventional models incorporating a Walrasian labor market. We also
show that a shift of direct to indirect tax-financing of government expenditures can improve
Spain’s competitiveness while its effects on the rest of EMU are also positive, but rather
small.
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